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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation, et al.,
Respondents,
vs.
CENTRAL WEBER SEWER IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT, a municipal corporation; LYMAN M. HESS,
ARTHUR P. BROWN, ELMER
CARVER, constituting the Board of
County Commissioners of Weber
County, a municipal corporation; and
LYMAN M. HESS, ARTHUR P.
BROWN and ELMER CARVER,
County Commissioners of Weber
County, a municipal corporation,

Case Nos.
8171, 8172,
8173, 8174,
8175,8176

Appellants.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents concur generally with the statement of
facts as set forth in the brief of appellants. However, by
concurring, respondents do not, of course, stipulate that the
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facts as stated by the appellants constitute all of the relevant facts in this matter. In this connection it should be
brought to the attention of the court here that appellants'
brief fails to set forth the properties of all respondents in
the stipulations which appellants set forth in their statement of facts, and that the properties which respondents
Union Pacific Railroad Company, Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, and Union Railway and Depot Company
seek to have eliminated from the district are set forth in
detail in the stipulations of fact with respect to those respondents on file therein.
The attention of the court is invted to the fact that although appellants have made eight assignments of error in
the case, they have grouped said assignments for purpose
of argument into three main points. Respondents will treat
these and other points in this brief.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The District Court properly received in evidence
stipulations of the parties as to the material facts. in this

case.
2. The District Court properly eliminated from the
district the properties of respondents which will not be
directly benefited by the proposed improvements.
A. The statutory requirements of elimination, upon protest, of property which will not be
directly benefited by the proposed improvements,
is not limited to the elimination of real property.
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B. The Trial Court propertly considered the
phrase "directly benefited" as that phrase appears in the 1951 act, and properly denied appellants motion to strike the word "directly" from
respondents pleadings.
C. The finding of the District Court that the
property will not be directly benefited by the proposed improvements is supported by the undisputed evidence.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE STIPULATIONS OF THE
PARTIES AS TO THE MATERIAL FACTS IN
THIS CASE.

,:.-r

, .. "'

The primary question to be considered here is whether
or not plaintiffs and respondents will have received due
process of law if appellants prevail in their contention that
the hearing in district court is legally limited to purely a
review of the proceedings held before the Board of County
Commissioners. That the requirements of due process must
be met is conceded by appellants who, on page 29 of their
brief, allege that the requirements of due process will have
been met if this court agrees with their contentions. In
support of their arguments, appellants cite merely "Laws of
Utah, 1951," Chapter 32, Section 3 and Rule 65 (B) (b)
(e)-Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. They dismiss the entire matter of due process with a vague citation to Tygeson
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Magna Water Company, 226 P. 2d 127. The matter of

due process cannot be treated so lightly.
Plaintiffs and respondents contend that the proceedings before the district court necessarily involved the introduction of evidence, and that the evidence was not only
admissible but was essential in order that the district court
might make proper findings, conclusions and judgments in
each case.
42 American Jurisprudence, Public Administrative
Law, Section 116, sets forth the requirements of due process
in the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial power, which
may be summarized as follows:
"(a) The trier of the facts must be an impartial tribunal legally constituted to determine the
right involved.
" (b) No findings shall be made except upon
due notice and opportunity to be heard.
" (c) The procedure at the hearing shall be
consistent with the essentials of a fair trial.
"(d) Witnesses shall be sworn on oath, examined and cross-examined, and evidence offered
and received in accordance with recognized principles of justice.
"(e) The hearing shall be conducted in such
a way and appropriate findings made so that there
will be opportunity for a court to determine whether
the applicable rules of law and procedure were observed."
If all of the above requirements were complied with by
the Board of County Commissioners in determining the
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issues of facts involved, then the contention of the appellants that the hearing in district court should have been
limited to a determination of whether or not the board
properly applied the law to facts as found, would have substantial merit. We believe, however, that an examination
of the nature of the proceedings taken before the Board of
County Commissioners readily demonstrates that any hearing held by that body did not meet the requirements of due
process of law.
A brief examination of Chapter 32 demonstrates that
the Board of County Commissioners is not constituted a fact
finding body in any sense of the term and is apparently not
empowered to determine any facts. The statute simply states
that the board shall eliminate from the proposed district any
property which it shall determine will not be directly benefited by the proposed improvements, and the determination,
so far as the statute discloses, can be made entirely in the
breast of the Board of County Commissioners. They are not
required to nor did they try or determine any facts to reach
their decision, and the resolution which the board passed
establishing the district so demonstrates (see paragraph 4
of the Resolution, page 7, appellants' brief, which simply
states that all property will be directly benefited and no
property will be eliminated).
Respondents further contend that the hearing before
the Board of County Commissioners was not conducted consistently with the essentials of a fair trial, which requires
that witnesses may be sworn on oath, examined and crossexamined, and evidence offered and received in accordance
with recognized principles of law. While the provisions of
Section 17-5-5 U. C. A. 1953 authorize a member of the
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Board of County Commissioners to administer oaths, no
provisions are made in said Chapter 32 empowering the
Board of County Commissioners to hear evidence, subpoena
witnesses, make findings or perform any acts universally
regarded as being essential to the conduct of a fair and
impartial hearing for the determination of issues here involved.

:~

;;Ji

A final essential requirement of due process in connection with the proceedings of administrative bodies is
that appropriate findings be made setting forth the basis
upon which ultimate facts are found or principles of law
applied. Paragraph 4 of the resolution creating the district
referred to above clearly demonstrates that the Commissioners neither made nor undertook to make any findings
whatever, but on the contrary simply concluded that none
of the property would be eliminated from the district and
created the district without any such elimination. It is
universally recognized that in the absence of findings by
an administrative body nothing is presented upon which a
court may determine whether or not the administrative body
acted pursuant to its jurisdiction and regularly pursued its
authority.
The appellants' position, namely that the failure of the
Board of County Commissioners to abide by the requisites of
due process is attributable solely to the fault of plaintiffs
and respondents who' should have insisted that the board follow the requirements of due process, seems somewhat untenable · here. Due process would indeed become purely
ethereal if the burden of guaranteeing its requirements were
cast upon those whom the doctrine is 'designed to protect.
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This is particularly true here where plaintiffs and respondents were entitled to assume that the Board of County
Commissioners correctly interpreted the extent of the
authority conferred upon them by Chapter 32, which authority manifestly falls far short of meeting the requirements of
due process. It is therefore obvious that the Legislature,
in enacting Chapter 32, did not intend the hearing before
the Board of County Commissioners to be a judicial or
quasi judicial inquiry meeting the requirements of due process, and wisely provided in the enactment for appeal to a
tribunal ideally constituted to determine facts and render
due process.
The propriety of the exercise of judicial power by the
administrative creatures of legislatures has been the subject of discussion and litigation since the inception of
"board government." The arguments which have persuaded
courts that such exercise has been proper are ( 1) that the
board in question is pecularily well qualified by training
and experience (or will become so) to determine questions
of fact within a special field of inquiry outside the general
ken of the judiciary, and (2) that such exercise is necessary in order to produce an efficient and effectvie administrative enforcement of the public interest in matters of
executive character (See Re Opinion of Justices, 87 N. H.
492, 179 A 344).

It must have been as obvious to the legislature as it is
to us that the County Commission is not specially qualified
by training and experience to determine such abstruse
questions as are here involved and will not become so by
daily organizing new districts. The strong likelihood is
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that this commission will never organiz~ another district
under this act. It is apparent also that the exercise of
judicial power by the commission is not necessary in order
to produce an efficient enforcement of the public interest.
The courts are readily available and well constituted to consider these problems, and their calendars will not become
cluttered with a plethera of such cases, as they would with
tax cases or rate cases or compensation cases.

I.

I"

The usual reasons for conferring judicial power on an
executive body are simply absent here.

r~

Treated in the light of the principles here considered,
it seems abundantly clear that the essential requirements
of due process were not complied with in the proceedings
taken before the Board of County Commissioners and that
the plaintiffs and respondents were entitled to introduce
evidence before the district court and that that court did
not err as alleged by the appellants. The authorities support these propositions.

In Patterick vs. Carbon Water Conservancy District,
145 P. 2d 503, our Supreme Court reviews the statute authorizing the creation of water conservancy districts under
the Water Conservancy Act of 1941. This act provides,
among other things, for the taking of certain proceedings
before the district court in connection with the organization
of such districts. The court in concluding that the· Act
affords due process of law observes that:
"As we have already shown, the proceedings
creating a Water Conservancy District is a judicial
proceeding. The sections quoted above provide for
notice of hearing to all persons interested. Such
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persons are given an opportunity to come into court
and object to the creation of the district, if they so
desire. This is the due process of law."
The foregoing statement clearly demonstrates that an
interested party must be given his day in court in order to
comply with due process of law.
:~

''·

In Tygeson v. Magna Water Co., 226 P. 2d 127, our
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of Chapter
24, Laws of Utah 1949, which was amended by Chapter 32,
Laws of Utah 1951, here directly involved. The court appears to take for granted the proposition that any property
owner affected would be entitled to present facts before
a court, for it points out that:
"Before the district is organized any owner
whose property may be affected and who has complied with the provisions of the Act as to written
protest may come into court and have the matter of
whether his property will be benefited or whether
the proceedings in establishing the· district have
been made in compilance with the statute, reviewed
by the court. This is due process." (Italicizing ours.)
It is to be noted that the Court did not say that the
record or actions of the Board could be reviewed, but clearly
stated that the matter of whether or not his property would
be benefited was to be reviewed by the Court.
The case of New England T. & T. Co. v. Department of
Public Utilities, 159 N. E. 743, 56 A. L. R. 784 (Mass.),
further illustrates this rule. In that case, an appeal was
taken from an order of the Massachusetts Department of
Public Utilities. The appeal was taken to a trial court. In
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the trial court, the telephone company undertook to prove
certain facts by evidence. The trial judge ruled that the
telephone company was not entitled to introduce any evidence under its petition and that the case must be decided
upon the record of the proceedings before the commission.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts in holding that the
telephone company was entitled to introduce evidence in
the proceeding before the court, stated that:
"The law is established that, upon an appeal
under Gen. Laws, chap. 25, section 5, the court will
not hear evidence to review or revise findings of
fact made by the department. No power is given to
rehear facts, (citing cases). The parties must not
withhold evidence from the department and produce
it in court, (citing cases). Where, however, there
is no finding of fact material to petitioner's right to
review, this rule does not forbid the presentation of
evidence to establish it. Such evidence is not offered in rehearing of issues of fact decided by the
department, but as the basis in fact to support a
claim of right. Unless such evidence is admissable,
the right to review given by the statute is not broad
enough to secure due process of law, and the statute
may be rendered unconstitutional, (citing cases).
There must be a fair opportunity for submitting the
issue of confiscation or undue interference with the
right of management to a judicial tribunal for determination upon its own independent judgment as
to both law and fact, (citing cases)."
If the respondents had been denied the right to introduce evidence before the district court and denied the right
to have appropriate findings of fact made in these cases,
such denials would unquestionably render Chapter 32 un-
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~(}\ \Q~ constitutional. It goes without saying that the Legislature

:u.\~1 ~:
()U\lc~ ~i

m~t~ 1

did not intend that its act would be unconstitutional, and
it therefore accordingly follows that it must necessarily

tb.ee~~

have been the Legislative intent to afford property owners

M~1

standing in the position of respondents the right to present

tiJUUr:,

evidence upon the issues of fact and law herein involved
and to have such evidence passed upon and the issue determined in accordance with the requirements of due
process of law.

'.,.......

. ,,;...-·-'

The principles announced in the Massachusetts case
are further illustrated in the case of Virginian Railway Co.
v. System Federation No. 40 et al., 57 S. C. T. 592, 300 U.
S. 515. That case involved a certification of representation
of a labor union by the National Mediation Board. The certification was made as a result of an election held for the
purpose of determining representatives for collective bargaining purposes. After certification by the National Mediation Board, suit was brought by the labor organization
against the railroad company in the district court of the
United States to compel enforcement of the certification of
the board. In the district court, evidence was introduced
pursuant to which the trial court found that the labor union
was the duly authorized representative of certain of the
employees of the railroad company. The railroad company,
in the Supreme Court of the United States, insisted that the
Certificate of the Mediation Board was fatally defective
upon the ground that the findings on which it was based
were not set forth. However, the trial court heard independent evidence on the subject and entered its own find-
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ings. In holding that the court was entitled to hear evidence
and make its· own findings, the Supreme Court said:
"Whether the certification, if made as to those
facts, is conclusive, it is unnecessary now to determine. But we think it plain that if the Board omits
to certify any of them, the omitted fact is open to
inquiry by the court asked to enforce the command
of the statute, (citing cases). Such inquiry was
made by the trial court which found the number of
eligible voters and thus established the correctness
of the Board's ultimate conclusion."
In the case at bar, inasmuch as repondents actually had
no hearing before the Board of County Commissioners of
such character as. to meet the requirements of due process
of law, and since no findings whatever were made, it becomes essential that the court hear the evidence in order to
make appropriate findings and decisions.
By reason and authority, it therefore appears abundantly clear that the district court did not err in receiving
any material or relevant evidence in connection with these
proceedings.

POINT II.
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY ELIMINATED FROM THE DISTRICT THE PROPERTIES OF RESPONDENTS WHICH WILL NOT
BE DIRECTLY BENEFITED BY THE PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS.
A. THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF
ELIMINATION, UPON PROTEST OF PROP-
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ERTY WHICH WILL NOT BE DIRECTLY
BENEFITED BY THE PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS IS NOT LIMITED TO THE ELIMINATION OF REAL PROPERTY.
Though the appellants devote some space in their
brief in support of the proposition that a district is a geographical area, this. point, we believe, can be conceded inasmuch as the act itself provides for geographical definition
thereof. Respondents, however, take issue with appellants'
proposition that only real property may be eliminated from
the district.
In this connection it should be pointed out that one of
the strongest reasons advanced by appellants for their contention is that Chapter 32 provides that only real property
is included in the district. Beginning at the bottom of page
32 of appellants' brief, they state as follows:
"Nowhere in the action is anything said about
including personal property in the district. In fact
the only thing that is discussed in the act as being
included is real property. Then when that same
statute goes on to say what shall be eliminated under
certain specified conditions, in the following language:
" 'In such resolution establishing such district, the board of County Commissioners shall
eliminate from said proposed qistrict any property originally included therein, but which it
shall determine will not be directly benefited
by the proposed improvements.'
it can only mean what it says, that the property
which might be eliminated, under the conditions

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
specified, is any of the property which was originally included in the proposed district. And the
only property which was included in the proposed
district was real property; and hence nothing but
real property could be eliminated from the district
or could have been eliminated from the proposed district in the first instance on the protest of the respondents."
Appellants maintain that any contrary view results in
absurdities, yet respondents feel that the viewpoint advanced by appellants is itself absurd. The only reason any
properties are included within,..a district of this type is for
taxation purposes. If p~rsonal property is taxable, it is unquestionably included within the district. If, as appellants
maintain, personal property is not included within the district, then appellants have suffered no injury by the judgment of the lower court eliminating personal property. It
should be further pointed out that the respondent railroad
companies did request and obtain elimination of certain real
property from the district. (Rights of way.)
Respondents' theory is that any kind of property, real
or personal, must be excluded from the district if it will not
benefit directly from the improvement proposed.
Respondents believe the legislative concept in the enactment of the chapter now under scrutiny was that the
districts should be financed in part by general taxation,
but only by the taxation of one kind of property, the kind
which "will be directly benefited" by the installation. The
Legislature directed the County Commissioners to eliminate from the district any other kind of property by this
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language from Section 3 of the Act: "In such resolution
establishing such district the Board of County Commissioners shall eliminate from said proposed district any property originally included therein but which it shall determine
will not be directly benefited by the proposed improvements."

What does the word "property" mean?
Appellants contend in their Motion that "property" as
used in the above quotation means "real property" only,
but they then point up some cogent evidence to the contrary.
The word "property" appears ten times in Sections 2 and
3, and eight of those ten times it appears in the phrase
"real property." Obviously, every time there was an intention to talk about real estate only, the phrase "real property"
was used. When the intention was to talk about property in
the broad natural sense, no limiting adjective was employed.
The court is familiar with the rule that words in a
Statute should be given their commonly accepted meaning.
(See 50 Am. Jur. 228; Emmertson vs. State Tax Commission, 93 Utah 219; 72 P. (2d) 476.) The commonly understood, natural, popular and recognized meaning of the word
"property" embraces all things with respect to which legal
relations between persons exist. In Metropolitan Trust Company vs. Jones, 51 N. E. (2d) 256, the court adopted a definition of property including "Every interest one may have
in any and every thing that is the subject of ownership by
man, together with the right to freely possess, enjoy and
dispose of the same." American Jurisprudence acknowledges that the general and popular understanding has been
held to be that property includes chattels. (42 Am. Jur.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16

188.) A perusal of "Words and Phrases" reveals no case
in which the word "property" alone has been held to mean
real property only.

Is there any reason to assign a restricted meaning to
"property" in this Statute?
To give the word "property" a narrow and restricted
meaning in the section of Statute above quoted can be
justified only if the application of the commonly accepted
meaning would defeat the purpose of the Statute and intent of the Legislature. Appellants must, therefore, contend that the purpose of the Statute and the intent of the
Legislature were that taxpayers in the district who owned
no real property should have no opportunity to attack the
procedure under which a tax will be imposed upon them
even though they may be the source of the majority of tax
funds. Such an unnatural and inequitable intent should be
ascribed to the Legislature only if the Statute is reasonably
susceptible to no other interpretation. Appellants position
is that the Statute is reasonably susceptible to no other interpretation because only real property owners may (1)
petition for the creation of the district or (2) by petition
defeat the creation of the district and because there are
provisions with reference to the manner in which protests
by real property OWI_lers should be signed. Respondents submit that the Legislature could reasonably and did intend
that only real property owners could force the creation of
the district but that other kinds of taxpayers could protest the inclusion of their property within it. There is nothing about the context of this Statute or the circumstances of
this legislation which would justify a different construction.
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A construction restricting exclusion to real property would
in fact do violence to the principle that tax statutes should
be construed in favor of the taxpayer. The Utah court approved and applied this principle in the case of Norville
vs. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170; 97 P. (2d) 937. At
page 177 the court says: "The doctrine that taxing statutes
are, in case of doubt as to the intention of the Legislature,
to be construed strictly against the taxing authority and in
favor of those on whom the tax is levied, has been well set
out in the case of (Citing cases) .

The Utah Legislature has enacted many laws. contem,plating territorial exclusions from political 'Subdivisions.
In each case language unequivocally relating to real property has been employed.
Some of the most persuasive evidence that the Legislature intended more than a territorial exclusion in the
quoted section of the Statute is that it has frequently enacted laws which would contemplate only territorial exclusion, and it has always used language which left no doubt
of its intention. For example, the water conservancy act
which provides for the creation of "districts" for the purpose of providing water for irrigation, industrial and
domestic purposes has a provision in it authorizing the district court which creates the district to exclude certain
lands from the district. The section of the Statute involved
is Section 73-9-30, Utah Code Annotated 1953. The Statute
reads:
"The owner or owners in fee of any lands constituting a portion of the district may file with the
board a petition praying that such lands be excluded
and taken from said district." (Italicizing supplied.)
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In drafting t!J.at Statute, the members of the Legislature had real property in mind and had in mind geographical and area elimination, solely, and consequently they specifically so provided by using the term "lands." It is reasonable to assume that the drafters of the water and sewer
improvement district act were well acquainted with the
language of the water conservancy act because of the general similarity in purpose and nature of the type of district contemplated. As is evidenced in the case of Tygeson
vs. Magna Water Co., 226 P. (2d) 127, counsel for the
Magna Water Company, an improvement district which was
created under a 1949 version of the same act under which
the defendant district was created, relied heavily on the
court's treatment of the water conservancy act to establish
the constitutionality of the water and sewer improvement
district act. The constitutionality of the water conservancy
act was adjudicated in the case of Patterick vs. Carbon
Water Conservancy District, 145 P. (2d) 503. The two acts
involve very similar constitutional law problems, and so
the writer repeats that, in all likelihood, the drafters of the
law being construed in this action were well acquainted
with the language used in the water conservancy act. They
undoubtedly took note of the use of the term "lands" in the
water conservancy act and, instead of repeating that term
in drafting the improvement district statute, they used the
term "property." Such a fact indicates that the intention
of the drafters and the intention of the State Legislature
was that the term ''property" should include all types of
property and not merely "lands."
It is also of significance to note that the drainage district statute, Section 19-1-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
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the language of which should also have been well known
to the drafters of the water and sewer improvement district
act, provides as follows :
"Provided that any person whose lands will not,
in the opinion of said board, be benefited by drainage by said system, may have such lands excluded
from such district upon application to said board,
* * *'; (Italicizing supplied.)
An additional example is provided by the Statutes of
the State of Utah relative to disconnection of territory
from an incorporated city or town. This Statute (10-4-1
Utah Code Annotated 1953) provides that land owners
desiring to disconnect territory from the incorporated limits of a city or town may do so by filing a petition in the
District Court setting forth the reason for the disconnectio:r~ and accompanied by a map or plat of the territory
sought to be disconnected. This, again, is an example of
legislative intent to provide for disconnection of territory
or geographical and area elimination as opposed to elimination of all types of property as is provided in the Statute
here under consideration. (Italicizing supplied.)

There is precedent in Utah for stautory elimination
of classes of prope;ty other than real property from a taxing district.
Exclusion, exemption or elimination of types of property other than real property from taxation or assessment
is not unknown to general law or to Utah law. In 51 Am.
Jur., Sec. 501, page 506, under the subject of Taxation and
Legislative Power, it is stated:
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"It is inherent in the exercise of the power to
tax that the sovereign state be free to select the
subjects of taxation and to grant exemptions therefrom, and unless restrained by some particular provision of the state constitution the legislature has
full power to exempt any person or corporation or
class of property from taxation, according to its
views of public policy and expediency." (Italicizing
supplied.)

Utah's water conservancy district act provides an example of elimination of property from assessment and taxation on a basis other than that of geographic or area considerations. Section 73-9-24, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
which is part of the water conservancy act, reads as follows:
"All property of whatever kind and nature
owned by the state and by towns, cities, school districts, drainage districts, metropolitan water districts, irrigation districts, park districts, water districts or any other governmental agency or agencies
within the said district shall be exempt from assessment and levy by the board as provided by this act
for the purposes herein contained." (Italicizing supplied.)
Consequently, eliminating or exempting property within the boundaries of a district of "whatever kind an nature"
from assessment and levy is nothing new to Utah law.
Appellants may argue that, inasmuch as the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah (Tygeson vs. Magna Water Co.,
supra), has adjudicated that the tax involved in this district
is a general tax and not a special assessment, that the tax
must be imposed upon all property within the boundaries of
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the district, with the assessment based upon the value of the
property. Such an argument has no foundation. The water
conservancy act language quoted in the previous subparagraph provides an instance in which the State provides for
a general tax but, at the same time, eliminates from the
imposition of that tax certain classes of property located
within the boundaries of the district.
A general tax is one which is imposed uniformly on
property, with the assessment based upon the value of the
property. Special assessment is a "tax" in which the assessment is based upon the degree of benefit provided the
various properties upon which the assessment is imposed.
Examples of special assessments are those where assessments for an irrigation district are determined by the number of acres of land owned by a property owner, or the
number of acre feet of water allotted to an owner's lands.
Another example of a special assessment is that imposed
upon the basis of the number of front feet which an owner
of land may have abutting on a street improvement. It is
true that the Statute to be construed in this action imposes
a general tax because it imposes a tax based upon the value
of all of the property which is included within and not
eliminated from the sewer district. The tax is not assessed,
for example, on the basis of the number of sewer connections which an owner of property may have. However, the
Statute provides for the elimination from any taxation
property which is not "directly benefited" by the proposed
improvement. In other words, this Statute provides for a
general tax upon all property within the sewer district
which is directly benefited, assessed uniformly upon the
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value of the property which is directly benefited. Consequently, there is nothing inconsistent about acknowledging
that a general tax is contemplated by this Statute, and, at
the same time, concluding that .certain types of property
are to be exempted and eliminated entirely from taxation.
Some of the properties eliminated from the district
by the lower court consisted of real properties of the various
respondent railroads. Appellants do not contend that the
elimination· of such real properties from the district constituted error by the lower court.

Even appellants have proceeded as if the Commission
had authority to exclude personal property.
It is significant that the Weber County Commission .
apparently proceeded on the theory that property other
than real property could be excluded in that they defined
the district in other than geographical terms so as to include personal property. In its Resolution of March 3, 1953,
the Commission declared "that the boundaries of said district are defined as follows, and all area and property lying
within these described bounds is now within and henceforth
a part of this sewer district:" The words of this Resolution
can only be interpreted to express an intent that all real,
personal and mixed property within the boundaries described should be a part of the district. Since the property
respondents seek to exclude was included by definition they
could reasonably seek its exclusion by the statutory procedure provided.

There is further reason why respondents feel the Board
had statutory authority to exclude personal property. If
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only real property directly benefited could be included in
the district, then the Commission could properly define the
district only on the basis of evidence of the specific installation the district proposed. Hereafter in this brief it will
be demonstrated that property is directly benefited by a
sewer only if it is connected or capable of direct connection.
A Commission could decide what real property could be
directly connected to a proposed sewer only if it had before
it a map or detailed description showing exactly where the
lines would be laid. Since the district has made no concrete
plans, the Commission could not have had such evidence
before it. It must, therefore, have proceeded on the theory
that the exclusion intended was the exclusion of the kinds
. of property which by their nature are incapable of connection to a sewer. These are exactly the kinds of property
which respondents seek to exclude.
In summary it should be pointed out that nowhere in
appellants' brief do they attempt or undertake to show that
the property eliminated from the district by the trial court
was or would have been direcly benefited by the sewer
facility proposed, and appellants do not undertake to apprise
the court of what constitutes a direct benefit. This particular matter will be discussed by respondents later in this
brief.
POINT II B.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE PHRASE "DIRECTLY BENEFITED" AS THAT PHRASE APPEARS IN
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THE 1951 ACT, AND PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE THE WORD
"DIRECTLY" FROM RESPONDENTS' PLEADINGS.
In the lower court the appellants moved for an order
striking from the pleadings of plaintiffs and respondents
the word "directly" wherever that word was used or combined with the word "benefited" in the phrase "directly
benefited" on the ground that the Legislature, after passing
Chapter 32, Laws of Utah 1951, later amended that Act
by eliminating the word "directly" from the phrase "directly benefited" as that phrase related to property to be
eliminated from the district. In their brief appellants cite
the 1947 Act, the 1949 Act, the 1951 Act, and the 1953 Act
and point out that only in the 1951 Act does the word "directly" appear before the word "benefited" where the Act
refers to the type of property which must be eliminated
upon protest from the district. Appellants then argue that
obviously the word "directly" must have been inserted in
the 1951 Act by mistake, inadvertence or some other reason,
but certainly not by intention of the Legislature. The trial
court had little difficulty with this contention. Appellants,
of course, must concede that their district was organized
under the 1951 Act and not under any other Act, and respondents do not believe that appellants can seriously support their motion to strike with the simple statement that
they believe the Legislature erred in inserting the word "directly" in the 1951 Act. What obviously happened was that
the 1951 Act, as proposed before that Legislature, was
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amended during the regular session in one particular only,
and that was simply to add the word "directly" before the
word "benefited" in the Act. This fact is plainly shown
by the House Journal for the 29th Regular Session of the
Legislature of the State of Utah and was further stipulated
to by the appellants in the various stipulations entered into
herein and now a part of the file in these cases (see paragraph No. 4, appelants' brief, page 11). In view of the
foregoing legislative history, it seems ridiculous for the
appellants to argue that the word "directly" crept into the
Act by inadvertence or accident.
POINT II C.
THE FINDING OF THE DISTRICT COURT
THAT THE PROPERTY WILL NOT BE DIRECTLY BENEFITED BY THE PROPOSED
IMPROVEMENTS IS SUPPORTED BY THE
UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE.
As previously pointed out, the appelants nowhere in
their brief allege or cite authority for the proposition that
the properties excluded in these cases by the trial court
are or could be directly benefited by the proposed sewer
facility. The appellants' brief seems to concede the fact
that the property eliminated from the district by the lower
court is not and could not be directly benefited by the proposed sewer. In addition appellants have stipulated with
each of the respondents as follows:
"That none of the property of the (respondents)
sought to be eliminated from said district

* * *
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in this Act is presently physically connected to any
sewage facility, and in the conduction of (respondents) operations it is not desirable or feasible to
make a physical connection of any of such property
to any sewage facilities."
Inasmuch as the Legislature specifically and intentionally inserted the phrase "directly benefited" in the 1951
Act, respondents feel the court should have the benefit of
authorities defining this phrase.
The Property whick Respondents seek to have Eliminated from the District will not be Directly Benefited by
the Proposed Improvements.
The only Utah case which the writer has been able to
find in which the term "direct benefits" is treated is the
case of Hatch vs. Edwards, 269 P. 138, and in that case
some light is shed upon the court's understanding of the
term "directly benefited." This case is not of value in this
action except as it throws enlightenment upon the court's
definition of that term. In other respects the case is not
analagous.
That case involved the Cache County Water Conservation District, an irrigation district which was organized
under Chapter 68, Laws of Utah 1919, as amended by Chapter 73, Laws of Utah 1921. This law provided for the creation of irrigation districts and for special assessments, and
the statute said:
"Assessments are to be made on the basis of
value per acre foot of water allotted to the lands
within the district."
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The statute further provided that an allotment of water
should be made to each 40-acre tract or smaller tract in
separate ownership and that the final allotment would be
on that basis for all assessments, tolls and charges levied
against the land. The allotments were made by the board
of directors of the district. The plaintiff in this case was
complaining because he claimed that water had been allotted
to 30 acres of his land but that 40 acres were being assessed.
The minutes of the directors provided for an allotment of
60 acre feet of water to a 40-acre tract, but the minutes
contained this further notation, "10 acres no allotment, wet,
30 acres, 2 acre feet per acre, total allotment 60 acre feet."
No change, however, was made in the description of the
40-acre tract of land in the record book of allotments, and
the entire 40-acre tract was subjected to assessment. The
court held that the assessor was justified in relying upon
the record of allotments and that it had been proper, therefore, to assess the entire 40-acre tract. The ruling of the
court in this case is not pertinent to this action but the
writer is interested in pointing out the language of the
court in its opinion with regard to the subject of direct
benefit. The pertinent language of the court is as follows:
"The contention of appellants is that from the
records referred to it conclusively appears that 10
acres of the land referred to was not benefited by
irrigation, and could not be subjected to assessments
for the purpose of the district, and that the proceedings resulting in the subsequent sale of the 40acre tract were void, because there was a sale of 10
acres of land not benefited by the improvement, and
the 30 acres which were benefited and subject to
assessment were not described. In support of this

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28

contention, if is argued that assessments for improvements of this kind must correspond to the benefits resulting to the land assessed, and that an assessment of property which is not benefited is void.
This general principle is indisputable. But in applying it to a particular case it is not essential that
every part of the property subjected to the assessment shall be directly benefited by the improvement.
It is not only competent but necessary to classify
property into units for the purpose of estimating
benefits, and, unless the classification is arbitrary
or unreasonable, the owner may not defeat the assessment by showing that some particular part of
the unit assessed is not directly benefited. * * *"
(Italicizing supplied.)
The supreme court acknowledged that the land to which
no allotment of water was made was not directly benefited.
It appears reasonable to the writer that a court which will
say that land is not directly benefited because irrigation
water is not allotted to it and will not flow over it when
water is allotted to and will flow over adjacent land, could
and would consistently also hold that property which cannot
be attached or connected to a sewer is not directly benefited,
though property adjacent to it or used in connection with
it is directly benefited.
In the case of Ferguson, et al. vs. Borough of Stamford,
(Connecticut), 22 A. 782, page 787, the court made some
contribution to the· definition of the term "direct benefits"
in the following language:
"The word 'benefits' when used unqualifiedly,
is a comprehensive term, including direct or special
benefits, and indirect or general. But when the con-
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nection in which it is used, and the subject matter
to which it is applied, are such as to indicate that
it is used in a limited or qualified sense, it is the
duty of the court to give it that interpretation. It
is used here in the charter of the borough. In the
ninth section of the charter of 1854 it is qualified
by the use of the adverb 'specially'. In the act of
1881 the adverb is dropped. But it is apparent that
it is used in the same sense, and signifies special and
direct benefits. This will appear more clearly, perhaps, from a consideration of the subject matter.
It is used with reference to an improvement undertaken by the community for the general benefit of
the community, but it results in a direct benefit to
those who have immediate access to the sewer, a
benefit in which those more remotely connected with
it do not participate." (Italicizing supplied.)
The appellants cite the case of Morton Salt Company
vs. City of South Hutchinson, 159 F. 2d 897, lOth Circuit
Court of Appeals, 1947, as authority for the proposition
that it is no constitutional defense to a tax that the taxpayer is not directfy benefited thereby. Respondents feel
that this point raised by appellants has no bearing whatsoever on the case at bar since we are not concerned with
a constitutional defense to a general taxing statute but are
relying upon a statutory right to have eliminated from the
district property which is not directly benefited. As a matter of fact the Morton Salt Company case is excellent authority defining the meaning of the term "direct benefit",
for the court states:
"The benefit conferred may be direct and tangible, such as * * * water or sewer line to the
taxpayer's door, or it may be indirect and intangible,
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such as a water works or sewer system which, although not available to the taxpayer, nevertheless
redounds to the benefit of the whole community of
which he is a part."
In that case the federal court referred to the case of
Thomas vs. Kansas City Southern R. Co., 261 U. S. 481, a
case which had arisen in Arkansas and which involved the
assessment of railroad right of way to assist in financing
a road improvement. In that case the Supreme Court of the
United States determined that the assessment against the
railroad property was discriminatory inasmuch as it was
on a basis inequitably different from the special assessment
on other property within the road improvement district.
The federal court in the Morton Salt Company case analyzed
this supreme court decision and stated:
"that the supreme court unanimously nullified (the)
assessment on the property of a railroad company
on the grounds that no direct benefits were conferred, and the indirect benefits, if any, were so
completely disproportionate and remote as to be
grossly discriminatory. * * *"
The United States Supreme Court itself in that case,
found in 261 U. S. 481, stated:
"It is doubtful whether any very substantial
appreciation in value of the railroad property within
the district will result from the improvements; and
very clearly it cannot be taxed upon some fanciful
view of future earnings and distributed values,

* * *"
Inasmuch as there are few, if any, cases involving a
general tax where the meaning of the words "direct benefit"
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is adjudicated, it is necessary to refer to special assessment
cases where the meaning of the term "benefit" is frequently
adjudicated and the meaning of the term "direct benefits"
has been elucidated in a few instances. In their brief, appellants do not claim that the property eliminated by the
lower court is or could be directly benefited because they
realize that to establish such direct benefits they must rely
entirely upon such indirect benefits as might accrue to the
respondents by virtue of the general benefit which will accrue to the community as a result of the proposed sewer
improvements, and that improvement of the community will
result in increased future earnings to the respondents. It
appears to the writer that the language of the United States
Supreme Court quoted above is very persuasive to demonstrate that in legal contemplation such benefits are not
direct benefits, for that court denounces the "fanciful view"
that "future earnings and distributed values" are direct
benefits.
InN ew York Bay R. Co. vs. City of Newark, 83 A. 962,
the question arose as to whether or not a railroad right of
way was benefited by the paving of a street which was adjacent to the railroad right of way. The Court said:
"The rule, therefore, with respect to assessments for local improvements is that the right of
way of a railroad company, being in legal contemplation land used for railroad purposes, cannot be
assessed upon the basis either of the general or special enhancement of its market value, but only for
actual benefit to such land for the public uses for
which it was acquired." (Italicizing supplied.)
In the case of Lehigh Valley R. Co. of New Jersey, et al.

vs. Mayor of Jersey City, 80 A. 228, a railroad company
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had its right of way through a marshy district and also
owned certain lots therein which it used for railroad purposes. Its tracks were upon high trestles. A sewer was put
through the marsh. The court held that, as to the right of
way, the railroad was not liable for any assessment having
received no benefit, but as to the other property if not used
for railroad purposes it was liable to assessments the same
as any other property, but if used it was liable only to the
amount of the benefits. The court's actual language is as
follows:
"As the matter goes back for reassessment it
is proper to deal with the special points made by
individual prosecutors. The railroad company claims
that it should not be assessed at all, and we think
that, as to its right of way strip, this claim is well
founded. Its railroad runs on a high trestle resting
on stone or concrete piers built in the marsh, and
by dumping from the trestle an embankment may
be gradually substituted. In any case the question
of drainage is quite immaterial to the railroad company. If the trestle stood in a pond it would make
no difference to it. There is manifestly no benefit
to this property for the purposes for which it is
used. And this is the test in such case. (Cases
cited.) But the railroad owns besides the right of
way, over 60 city lots, some adjoining the right of
way strip, some disconnected from it. It does not
appear whether these lands are used in whole or
part for railroad purposes. If not so used they a~e
assessable like any other lands; if so used, and If
benefited for such purposes by the sewer, they are
assessable, not to the extent of enhancement of
market value but to the extent of benefit for railroad purposes. * * *"
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In the case of City of Lincoln vs. Chicago & A. R. Co.,
104 N. E. 277, the question again arose as to whether or
not the right of way of a railroad was benefited by stre.et
improvement. The court went into considerable detail to
say that the determination of benefits must be based upon
the benefit to the property in its particular use and concluded that, based on that standard, the right of way was
not benefited. Excerpts from the opinion of the court are
as follows:
"Counsel for the appellant insist that the evidence on the question of benefits, on the hearing
before the jury, should have been restricted to the
market value of the property limited to railroad
purposes; while counsel for the appellee argue that
the measure of benefits for this improvement was
the enhanced value of the property by reason of the
pavement for any purpose for which the property
could be used, without regard to its being restricted
to railroad purposes. Cases have arisen in this and
other jurisdictions in which the improvement would
confer a special benefit upon the property assessed
if it were used for ordinary purposes, but when used
for the special and peculiar purpose the improvement
conferred no special benefit upon the property while
devoted to such special use * * *

"* * * Where the property is restricted by
statute or grant to a particular use, and cannot be
legally applied to any other use, and is at the time
of the improvement devoted to such particular use,
the true measure of the benefit which the improvement will confer is the increased value for the restricted use, in the absence of proof reasonably
tending to show that the property in question, having regard to present conditions and the existing
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business and wants of the public, is about to be
devoted to other uses. * * *

"* * * 'The question, then, here must be,
in the absence of proof tending to show that the
property in question is devoted to other than right
of way purposes, or is about to be so devoted, will
it, for the purposes of right of way for the two
tracks of appellee, be benefited by the improvement
of the street upon which it borders? It must be
borne in mind that railroad right of way cannot be
put upon the market by a railroad company for
general business purposes, as can private property.'
"* * * Under these rules it is clear that any
evidence as to benefits that might be taken concerning the 100-foot strip of right of way included in
the assessment should be restricted to the special
and peculiar use for which the property was thus
devoted. * * *"
The New Jersey and Illinois cases cited above place
considerable emphasis upon the factor that those attempting
to prove benefit to a railroad right of way must show that
the benefit is to the property in its use as a right of way.
It is clear that the proposed improvements of the appellant

district in this case will not render the railroads' right of
way, or the transmission lines or rails located thereon, or
the rolling stock, any more beneficial to the railroads for
railroad purposes or the property of the other parties respondents any more beneficial to said respondents for the
purposes for which said properties are used. Under the rulings of the New Jersey and Illinois cases it is adjudicated
that there is no "benefit," let alone no "direct benefit."
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Dillon on Municipal Corporations, at page 2619, cites
the New York case of People vs. Kingston, 53 N. Y. App.
Div. 58, and states as follows:
"\Vhere the authority conferred vras to assess
the cost of a sewer 'against the property immediately benefited thereby' it was held that an assessment could not be made on property on a parallel
street which could only be connected with the sewer
by the construction of a connecting sewer 350 feet
long."
Dillon, on the same page, refers to several New Jersey
cases, including Kellogg vs. Elizabeth, 40 N. J. Law 274,
and states as follows :
"In New Jersey it was held by the supreme
court that the special and peculiar benefit justifying a sewer assessment is a present benefit immediately accruing from the construction of the work,
and that intended benefits which may never be realized were not sufficient, mere speculative benefit
not being a benefit which can be recognized. Hence
it was held that the land which cannot be drained
into a trunk sewer until connecting laterals are
built cannot be assessed for the cost of the trunk
sewer until the laterals are constructed."
In 37 A. L. R., at page 249, the editors refer to a pertinent New Jersey case with the following language :

"* * * New Jersey, R. & Transp. Co., Prosecutor, v. Elizabeth (1875) 37 N. J. L. 330, it was
contended that a railroad right of way was a public
highway, and, therefore, not liable to assessment
for sewer improvements. In answer the court states:
'The premises are the property of the company and
are owned and used by it for the emolument of the
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company and its stockholders. The drainage of land
devoted to that purpose, and so used, by the construction of sewers, may be a direct benefit to it
in the use to which the lands are appropriated, in
making more solid the foundation of the roadbed
and relieving it from the flow of surface water.
Benefits accruing in this manner from the construction of a public improvement are of a character that
will justify the laying of assessments for the cost
and expenses thereof within the limit of the benefits conferred.' It was held, however, in that case,
that the fact that the nearest point of location of
the sewer improvement to the right of way was onehalf mile, without any connection therewith, showed
that the sewer in its present condition was of no
benefit to the right of way, and that, therefore, the
right of way was not liable for the assessment, even
though there was a possibility that in the future
another sewer would be constructed to connect the
right of way with the existing one."
The facts stipulated in the case at bar reveal that no
drainage is contemplated and that it is not feasible or desirable that the sewer be connected to any of the properties
described in respondents protests. In 37 A. L. R. 261, the
editors refer to a Connecticut case with the following
language:
"Property of a railroad company purchased for
the purpose of storing freight cars and, so far as
used, used exclusively for that purpose, the greater
portion of which is wholly unoccupied, which. is
eligibly situated for mechanical and manufactunng
purposes, and for such purposes would be especially
benefited by a sewer, is liable for a sewer assessment. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. New Britain
(1881) 49 Conn. 40. The intimation is, however,
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that had the land been permanently dedicated to
railroad purposes, such as a right of way for its
through line, it would not have been liable, probably on the theory that no benefit could have accrued. * * *"
The language contained in the "intimation" above is
applicable to the case at bar because the properties which
the respondent railroads are attempting to have eliminated
from the district are properties which are permanently dedicated to railroad purposes.
What has been said with reference to railroad rights
of way applies a fortiari to the interests and properties of
the respondent utilities. The cases establish without dissent
that a "direct benefit" is at least of equal magnitude with
the "special benefit" necessary to support a special assessment. The described properties of respondent utilities certainly do not derive such benefit from an improvement district that they can be specially assessed.
"The equipment and fixtures in the street, used
by public service corporations, and the rights and
privileges and franchises enjoyed by them, which
have been availed of for the purpose of placing this
kind of property in the street, is not subject to assessment for public improvements, such as street
improvements." (Citing cases.) McQuillan-Municipal Corporations, 3rd Edition, Volume 14, Section
38.77, page 205.
Such property therefore does not benefit directly, consequently it can not properly be included in a district
organized under this statute.
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In conclusion, the only evidence before the trial court
consisted of the stipulations on file herein that none of the
properties eliminated by the lower court could be physically
connected to the sewer facility proposed, and that such a
connection would not be desirable or feasible, and all of
the case authority is that there can be no direct benefit from
a sewer facility to property which is not and cannot be
directly connected to the facility. It follows, then, that none
of the property excluded could be directly benefited because
none of that property could be directly connected, and
as a consequence there was ample evidence before the trial
court to support the judgments rendered herein.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion respondents submit that the trial court
did not err as contended by appellants and that the judgments rendered by that trial court should be upheld and
affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
S. N. CORNWALL, of VanCott,
Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy,
Attorneys for the Denver & Rio
Grande Western Railroad Company and the Mountain States
Telephone and Telegraph Company,
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FRANK ALLEN, of Irvine, Ovard
and Allen, Attorneys for Utah
Power and Light Company,
WOOD R. WORSLEY, of Skeen,
Thurman, Worsley & Snow, Attorneys for the Bamberger Railroad Company and the Lake
Shore Transportation Company,
MARVIN J. BERTOCH, of Leverich, Bronson, Miner, Coray &
Bertoch, and ALBERT R. BOWEN, of Ray, Quinney, & Nebeker, Attorneys for Southern Pacific Company, Union Pacific
Railroad Co., Oregon Short Line
Railroad Co. and the Ogden Union Railway & Depot Co.,
B. Z. KASTLER, JR. and RAY,
RAWLINS, JONES & HENDERSON, Attorneys for Mountain Fuel Supply Company.
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